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Abstract 
This paper introduces a methodological innovation into Generational Accounting. By 
incorporating cyclically-adjusted balances into the forward-looking budget projections 
underlying the concept we isolate pure policy effects, which render comparisons of the 
fiscal sustainability indicators obtained across time and countries truly meaningful. We 
also show that a demographic effect and a debt effect may bias fiscal sustainability 
measures over time, and establish a routine to control for these effects in the 
generational accounting framework. An empirical application for Spain illustrates that 
our proposed decomposition of indicators is empirically relevant. Standard generational 
accounting suggests that fiscal sustainability in Spain improved substantially in 
preparing for EMU. However, calculation of the pure policy effects reveals that this has 
not been the case. 
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1. Introduction 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was designed to draw the attention of decision-
makers to the development of public deficits and debt. However, the ad-hoc deficit and 
debt ceilings in the Economic and Monetary Union specified in the Treaty of Maastricht 
may well not be very informative with regard to the actual stance of fiscal policy – a 
fact suddenly uncovered all too clearly by the current European debt crisis. 
In the short term, government revenue and expenditure levels vary over the 
business cycle even when the underlying fiscal policy parameters are constant. An 
exact picture of debt policies under way thus requires eliminating cyclical effects from 
government balances. There are several approaches to disentangle cyclical and 
structural components in current government balances. These methods generally build 
upon econometric analysis of correlations between government revenue and 
expenditure, and some measure of economic activity. The common feature is that de-
trending is based on past government experiences. Hence we may speak of backward-
looking techniques. Larch and Turrini (2009) review the main shortcomings 
encountered in implementing this technique as a tool to assess fiscal surveillance. 
Furthermore, in the medium and long term, current deficits or surpluses may 
turn out to be more or less sustainable when demographic dependency rates deteriorate. 
This means that for constant and even for cyclically neutral fiscal parameters, a given 
budgetary imbalance can develop into larger or smaller deficits in the future depending 
on the composition of government expenditure and revenue, in particular by age. In 
assessing current fiscal policy, according to the neoclassical model of debt in a general 
equilibrium framework, intertemporal sustainability matters, since it affects 
consumption patterns of rational individuals optimizing over the life-cycle. The various 
methods for evaluating fiscal sustainability available from the literature, surveyed by 
Balassone and Franco (2001), are generally forward-looking. The most advanced of 
these techniques develop projections for the future path of primary imbalances and 
generate estimates of the fiscal policy adjustments required to stabilize government 
debt at some predetermined rate of GDP. Balassone et al. (2009) present different 
quantitative indicators to assess the sustainability of public finances in the euro area 
against the backdrop of ageing.  
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Where measures of fiscal sustainability have been repeatedly calculated, the 
experience is that the results can vary substantially over very short periods. However, 
the swings are only partly due to structural changes in fiscal policy. As the primary 
imbalance at the start of the projections varies over the business cycle, inter-temporal 
fiscal imbalances tend to fluctuate cyclically, too. In order to determine whether fiscal 
policy is actually expansionary or contractionary, it is therefore informative to separate 
the cyclical and structural components in fiscal sustainability measures. Conceptually 
this is also a prerequisite for meaningful cross-country comparisons, as individual 
countries are likely at different stages of the business cycle in a given year. 
In this paper, we expand the standard forward-looking analysis of fiscal 
imbalances by integrating backward-looking de-trending procedures. Specifically, we 
incorporate the method by Girouard and André (2005), which is the basis for the 
standardized measure of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance reported by the 
European Commission, into Generational Accounting (GA), a widespread framework 
for applied fiscal sustainability analysis in a changing demographic environment 
developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992).  
This approach is linked to previous work by Hagist and Benz (2008) who 
applied HP-filters in order to obtain neutral budget aggregates for a generational 
accounting analysis of fiscal sustainability in Germany. However, our proposed method 
in addition establishes routines to control for what we call a demographic effect and a 
debt revaluation effect. This paper uncovers that these two effects, in addition to the 
cycle effect, may blur the pure policy effect, if one compares the year-to-year changes 
in the established generational accounting indicators of fiscal sustainability. 
Our empirical application deals with Spain, where public deficits showed a 
remarkably strong decline during the second half of the 1990s. In preparing for EMU 
the deficit-to-GDP ratio fell from 7.2 per cent in 1995 to 0.1 per cent in 2004. It 
continued to improve, reaching a surplus between 2005 and 2007 (1.3, 2.4 and 1.9 per 
cent, respectively), reversing only in 2008 because of the financial and housing market 
crises. As a result, according to conventional GA measures, it seems that sustainability 
of Spanish fiscal policy has improved by a wide margin in preparing for EMU. 
However, if one relies on cyclically neutral generational accounting, the picture 
becomes quite different: as we show in Section 3, some signals of the current fiscal 
sustainability problems were already present in the period 1995-2005.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
outline the standard GA method and the modifications needed in order to disentangle 
pure policy effects from the cycle and other effects hiding them. Section 3 illustrates 
the method by means of an application to the Spanish case over the period 1996-2005. 
Finally, Section 4 is devoted to conclusions and further remarks. 
2.  Isolating Cyclical and Structural Components in Fiscal 
 Imbalances 
This section first presents the conventional practice of GA, which measures the 
intertemporal fiscal imbalance in government budgets. We demonstrate that the fiscal 
sustainability measures generated tend to perpetuate initial business cycle conditions. 
Next, we give a short introduction to the method by Girouard and André (2005) of 
adjusting the components of current fiscal imbalances for business cycle effects. 
Finally, we give an account of the method proposed to disentangle the true change in 
sustainability from other factors influencing the GA calculations. 
2.1. Conventional Generational Accounting 
Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992) proposed GA to assess redistribution 
between current and future generations through public debt in the face of demographic 
changes.1 The method is based on the old theoretical notion that debt cannot increase at 
a faster rate than GDP for ever since otherwise, in a dynamically efficient economy, the 
taxes needed to service interest payments converge to an infinite value (Domar, 1944). 
Specifically, GA defines a sustainable fiscal policy as one capable of meeting the 
intertemporal budget constraint of the government in absolute terms: 
tt
tt
tt rSD


 0
0
0
)1(   (1) 
Where St is the primary public surplus in period t, Dt0 is the value of public debt in the 
base period t0, and r is the discount rate applied to take the value of future payments 
                                                 
1 See Havemann (1994) and Buiter (1997) for critical assessments of generational accounting. 
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back to the base period.2 In other words, a sequence of future primary surpluses is 
considered sustainable, if its aggregate present value is sufficient to pay for the initial 
level of government liabilities. Most fiscal sustainability measures in the literature start 
from this or a closely related definition of fiscal sustainability. For example, the tax-gap 
indicator proposed by Blanchard et al. (1990), the most prominent alternative to the 
fiscal sustainability measures of GA, is based on the sustainability condition that the 
aggregate present discounted value of the ratio of primary deficits to GDP is equal to 
the negative of the current level of debt to GDP. This condition is weaker than the one 
set out before – it allows any positive debt-to-GDP ratio in absolute terms as long as it 
converges to zero in present value terms. In contrast, GA requires that the debt-to-GDP 
ratio converges to zero in absolute terms over an infinite time horizon. 
No matter which sustainability concept is applied, a major difficulty is obtaining 
a meaningful long-term projection for primary imbalances. In order to capture the effect 
of demographic changes on public budgets, GA groups the primary surplus by cohort. 
Let Pjt be the number of the population of age j in period t, J the maximum age and  jt 
the average per-capita net tax payment by persons of age j in period t, then  



J
j
jtjtt PS
0
 .3  (2) 
Testing the sustainability condition (1) hence requires a population forecast and a 
forecast of age-related per capita net tax payments. For the former, generational 
accountants normally refer to official demographic projections. With regard to the latter, 
the basic concept is to assume that age-related per capita revenue and spending levels 
stay constant from the base period in terms of real per capita GDP: 
0
0
tt
jtjt )g1(
   (3) 
Where g is the per-capita real GDP growth rate. The vector of age-specific net tax 
payments in the base period is obtained from micro data on age-related tax payments 
                                                 
2 There is no unique approach to the debt measure. The choice is between gross and net values, market 
and face values. See Baldassare and Franco (2001) for a discussion of the various possibilities. 
3 Net tax payments are defined as the sum of taxes paid minus the total of transfers received. Since 
Raffelhüschen (1999), net taxes generally also include government consumption. It is treated as a non-
age-related expenditure. This means that for each age group the level of net taxes shifts by a constant 
amount.  
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and benefit receipts, which are rescaled so that individual net tax payments weighted by 
cohort size add up to the actual primary imbalance in the base period as measured by the 
national accounts.  
If the primary imbalances computed on the basis of (2) and (3) violate the 
intertemporal financing condition (1), fiscal policy is unsustainable. To finance the 
difference between the absolute value of initial debt and aggregate primary surpluses, 
the so-called sustainability gap (SG), fiscal policy must be adjusted at some future 
point in time. For example, if the sustainability gap is positive, per-capita revenue has 
to increase, or per-capita spending has to fall relative to what is predicted on the basis 
of the initial fiscal parameters. In this respect, the sustainability gap constitutes an 
intertemporal financial liability of the government. We will call fiscal policy that 
increases (decreases) the sustainability gap expansionary (contractionary). 
In principle, evaluating the sustainability gap is sufficient to indicate the extent 
of intertemporal imbalance in government finances. Nevertheless, the outcome of the 
forward-looking projections is normally summarized through a metric that allows a 
simple interpretation. We follow Auerbach (1997) in expressing the sustainability gap 
in terms of the aggregate discounted value of future GDP. This value is projected in the 
same spirit as the sustainability gap – GDP per worker in the base period is updated for 
labour productivity growth, and linked to a projection of the future labour force. The 
resulting relative sustainability indicator, SI in the following, represents the share of 
intertemporal liabilities in intertemporal economic resources. It is the change in the 
primary balance (as a share of GDP) in each future period that would ensure repayment 
of past debt.  
This synthetic indicator does not say anything as to the timing of the actual 
policy adjustments as the effects of demographic changes on primary balances 
gradually develop. GA, like many studies of age-related budget dynamics, does not 
attempt an accurate description of future developments. The purpose is rather to make a 
statement on current fiscal parameters. This leads to the adoption of a constant policy 
approach. Effects of future changes in behavior or policies in response to a changing 
demographic environment are not embodied in the prediction of primary imbalances. 
Generally, the mechanistic forecasting scheme given by (3) is only modified to 
incorporate two factors that are consistent with the constant policy perspective: (a) the 
continuation of structural trends not related to demography, e.g. per capita health 
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expenditure growing at a faster rate than real GDP, and (b) the effects of changes 
already introduced in legislation, but not yet showing up in current payment levels. This 
in particular concerns the results of pension reforms which often unfold slowly. 4 
However, considering that 


J
j
jtjtt PS
0
000
 , it is obvious that constant growth 
updating according to (3) not only perpetuates initial fiscal policy parameters, but also 
the initial economic conditions, to the extent that primary imbalances, for constant 
fiscal policy, vary over the business cycle. 
In fact, one of the main limitations of the GA sustainability indicators is that 
they tend to perpetuate the initial business cycle conditions reflected both in S  and in 
  above. This aspect is important for a correct interpretation of generational accounts. 
In general, government tax revenue increases and transfer spending falls during a 
boom, whereas the opposite happens during a recession. Accordingly, life-time net tax 
burdens measured by the generational accounts and the sustainability gap develop pro-
cyclically. As a consequence, fiscal policy might appear more or less sustainable, 
depending just on the macroeconomic stance in the base period of the projection. 
There could be different solutions to avoid business-cycle bias in the 
generational accounts. A first approach would be to take a period with average 
utilization of economic capacity as the starting point for the calculations. This idea has 
not yet been applied by generational accountants, who generally aim at evaluation of 
contemporaneous fiscal policy, which might be different from that in the period that 
was neutral with respect to the economic cycle. Another option, applied by Feist et al. 
(1999) to Finland, consists of departing from the contemporaneous government budget 
as a starting point, but making discrete adjustments during the forecast that design a 
return to what is considered a cyclically neutral state. The typically ad hoc nature of the 
required assumptions on the transition could be a serious point of criticism against this 
approach. 
                                                 
4 In our particular application, we incorporate particularities of the Spanish pension system. In particular, 
the maturing of the system and the inflation adjustment of non-entry pensions is considered.   
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In this paper we propose a more systematic procedure, which could also be 
aimed at international comparisons as relays in a previous adjustment of the initial 
budget according to a homogenous procedure, like the Cyclical Adjustment of Budget 
Balances (CABB) method developed by the European Commission from 2002. As we 
will see later, this procedure permits us to disentangle the change in sustainability 
measured by GA not only in the cyclical effect, but also in another two effects that 
might disguise the pure policy effect: a demographic and a policy effect.  
2.2. Eliminating the cyclical component in budget balances 
The need to evaluate the sensitivity of public budget to the business cycle has 
motivated the appearance of several techniques. The different approaches mainly differ 
in the way of identifying the cycle in economic activity and the sensitivity of budget 
items to the cycle (van den Noord, 2000). The main issue is nevertheless the former, as 
the measurement of potential output (or trend output) and hence of output gap, will 
affect the measurement of the sensitivity of budget aggregates to economic activity. 
Two main options arise. First, according to the mechanical approach, the so-called 
trend long-run level of output is directly extracted from output data using econometric 
smoothing devices like Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filters. Having an important technical 
drawback – the end point bias – this method has the advantage of being transparent and 
hence it is possible to establish non-arbitrary standard comparable methods, necessary 
in the context of policy agreements like the SGP. Second, a more theory-based 
approach (the production function approach) uses the elements of the production 
function in order to measure the long-run level of output, now called potential output. 
The improvement in theoretical foundations has the drawback of increasing the 
arbitrariness in the decisions of key variables like the structural unemployment rate, the 
rate of technological change, the way it affects productive factors, etc. 
The European Commission started using an HP filter, gradually moving towards 
a production function approach.5 Nevertheless, there are still some countries for which 
                                                 
5 The OECD uses a broadly similar approach. See EC (2002b) for a comparison of results. The 
Commission method is described in EC (2002a, 2003a,) and EC (2001, 2002, 2003b). Results are shown 
in both publications while the latter gives a general overview of the state of public finances in the EMU in 
the context of the Stability Growth Pact. 
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the HP filter has been estimated due to a lack of data. In particular, the EC method 
estimates the potential output based on a Cobb-Douglas production function, where the 
inputs are the capital stock and potential labour. The latter is estimated combining data 
on the working age population; a measure of the total factor productivity trend; labour 
force participation obtained through the HP filter, and the NAIRU unemployment rate, 
derived from a Kalmar filter Phillips curve approach.6  
Once the output gap and the structural level of unemployment are estimated, the 
second step consists of determining the sensitivity of revenues, expenditures and the 
resulting budget to the cycle. For that purpose the elasticities of budget components are 
estimated from past data and used to obtain the future aggregates. In particular, 
Girouard and André (2005) obtain the adjusted tax ( *tT ) and expenditure (
*
tG ) as  
yit
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Being tY the observed and 
*
tY  the potential output; tU  and 
*
tU  actual and structural 
unemployment; yti , the elasticity of the i-th tax category with respect to the output gap; 
and ug ,  the elasticity of current primary expenditure with respect to the ratio of 
structural to actual unemployment. From the expenditure side only unemployment 
expenditure is considered to be affected by the cycle, while from the revenue side, 
personal and corporate income tax, indirect taxation and social security contributions 
are included. Once elasticities are estimated the CABB, *tS , can be estimated for the 
base year or any future year. 
The EC employs an average revenue and expenditure elasticity calculated from 
the values estimated by OECD. In our context it is useful to keep the aggregates as 
disaggregated as possible in order to be able to predict the different demographic 
dependency of each of them. Hence, we employ the disaggregated elasticity. Table 1, 
                                                 
6 See EC (2002b) for details. 
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shows values of elasticities estimated for Spain in comparison to groups of other 
countries. The Spanish elasticity of minus 0.15 for current overall expenditure 
corresponds to an elasticity of minus 3.30 for the unemployment expenditure. 
Overall, as Larch and Turrini (2009) point out, despite the fact that users of this 
instrument – both academics and in policy making – “tend to waver between blind love 
and deep dissatisfaction”, its shortcomings have been dealt with and it currently plays a 
key role in the fiscal surveillance framework of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
Indeed, Égert (2010) reviews the recent findings on the role of fiscal policy over the 
business cycle, measuring discretional fiscal policy through the CABB. 
2.3. Decomposing changes in fiscal sustainability 
So far, using the procedure explained above we eliminate from  , and hence from S, the 
cyclical component, obtaining cyclically neutral net taxes and budget balance *  and 
S*. Hence, if we rewrite equation (1) replacing S with S* we can compute cyclically 
neutral GA, obtaining the SG from,  
0
0
0
0
)1(* t
tt
tt
tt SGrSD  


   (6) 
Nevertheless, the resulting series of sustainability indicators are not yet 
informative enough about the evolution of sustainability over time. If we were to start 
our GA exercise one year later, we would estimate equation (7), which is equation (6) 
delayed one year and considering that 
000 1 ttt
SDD    
1
1
1
*
1 0
0
0
0
)1( 


   ttt
tt
tt SGrSD   (7) 
The last period considered being infinite, postponing the calculations by one year 
should not in principle change results by a big amount. Yet in practice several effects 
can occur that change the sustainability measures from year to year, even if pure policy 
parameters remain constant. 
The first possible effect one could call is a debt effect. In principle, the difference 
between 10 tD and 0tD should equal 0tS . Yet the current stock of debt figures entering 
the calculations is usually affected by some other factors besides the current budget 
balance, like valuation changes, variation in public assets, and the like. The second 
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effect one could call a demographic effect. As suggested by equation (2), the primary 
surplus in a given starting period depends not only on the policy parameters reflected in 
the vector of net tax payments *  but also on the population structure of the base year. 
To see these effects, first rewrite (2) as (2’) 
*
0
*
tt
J
j
jtjtt PS  

    (2’) 
Where t and *t  are the population vector and the cyclically-adjusted net tax vector for 
year t, respectively. For simplicity, assume that there is no discounting ( 0r ) and that 
there is no growth updating of tax payments ( 0g ), so that   remains constant, once 
it is rescaled to the budget aggregates. Given this simplification, using (2’) to rewrite 
equations (6) and (7) leads to 
0
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A comparison of (6’) and (7’) shows that the change between the SG in 0t  and 
10 t  involves different effects. First, the difference in net tax revenues is a mixture of 
the pure policy effect. i.e., the change in  , and the demographic effect, i.e., the change 
associated with the fact that the net tax payments are initially weighted using a different 
population vector. Second, the wealth effect stems from the windfall gains or losses on 
the condition that the equality  
0000 1 tttt
DD   does not hold. 
Note that in addition, a discounting effect may obscure the pure policy effect. 
Ceteris paribus, if one moves from one starting year to the next the effect of discounting 
changes the weight of future positive of negative monetary flows. To grasp this effect, 
suppose a positive primary surplus for some years at the beginning of the projection, but 
primary surpluses falling below zero in later years. As moving the starting year brings 
the period of negative surpluses closer, they are discounted by less, and accordingly, 
everything else equal, the measured sustainability gap must become larger. Of course, 
the discounting effect will be very small if one just compares GA indicators for two 
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consecutive periods. But if one aims at comparing a longer time series of GA indicators, 
it may require attention. 
In order to isolate the pure policy effects in the GA sustainability indicators from 
the other above-mentioned effects, it is necessary to proceed in several steps. In 
particular, we propose the following procedure.  
First, subtract the SG, computed on the basis of equation (1) from the cyclically 
neutral SG, computed on the basis of equation (6). This first step controls for the 
business cycle effect in the budget aggregates. Second, estimate the SG by replacing 
10 tD with 0tD  in equation (7), i.e. 
1
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Subtracting the estimates obtained from equation (8) from those obtained from equation 
(7), which is (6) delayed one year, takes care of the wealth effect. Third, estimate  
1
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by plugging a modified (2) – the surplus for given year if one combines the tax profiles 
of that year with the population structure of the previous year – into (8). This yields the 
demographic effect for each year as the difference between the value of the SG obtained 
from (8) and the value obtained from (9). 
Finally, obtain the pure policy effect as a residual, by subtracting all the isolated 
effects from the total effect. Alternatively and equivalently, we can obtain the pure 
policy effect by using the third stage SG. Note that during the procedure we 
successively eliminate the cyclical effect (equation 6), the debt effect (equation 8) and 
the demographic effect (equation 9). Hence, we can compute the change in the SG 
between two subsequent years by subtracting the value of this last series – which 
contains only the policy effect – from the cyclically neutral SG estimated from equation 
(6). 
In the following section we show an illustration of this disentangling procedure 
applied to the Spanish case for the period 1996-2005.  
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3. Application: A time-series of GA results for Spain 
In this section we apply the methodology explained above to the Spanish case. In the 
first subsection we summarize the data needed for the calculations and in the second 
subsection we present the results. 
3.1 Baseline assumptions and data  
The computation of the sustainability gap requires a very long-term demographic 
forecast to determine future cohort size, projections of per capita tax payments and 
transfer receipts by age and gender and aggregate figures for these categories. Our 
projections start from year 1996 while aggregates are updated up to 2005.  
Given that our time horizon exceeds that adopted by official population 
projections, we extend it for a longer period by setting the same assumptions using the 
usual component method. We start from observed levels of individual mortality and 
fertility, and then broadly follow the demographic hypotheses adopted by the INE 
(2005). More specifically, population projections account for a progressively 
decelerating increase in individual survival probabilities until 2050. By then life-
expectancy at birth will have increased by about five years, reaching 81 years and 87 
years for males and females, respectively. Total fertility is assumed to recover linearly 
from the very low 2000 rate of 1.14 to a level of 1.52 by 2021, and to remain constant 
thereafter. Immigration is assumed to decrease gradually, from the initial high levels 
observed to 260,000 in 2060. Our demographic projections predict that old-age 
dependency – defined as the number of persons aged 65 and above as a share of persons 
aged 20 to 64 – will jump from below 25% in 1996 to a maximum of nearly 62% by 
2050. In the long term, as fertility rates remain below replacement level and life-
expectancy increases, the dependency ratio converges towards 52%, twice its current 
value. 
One of the critical parts of GA concerns the construction of profiles describing 
how fiscal legislation assigns individual claims and liabilities against the public sector 
to specific age groups. The profiles employed here rely on previous work detailed in 
Abío et al. (2005) and Patxot et al. (2012). Finally, the aggregates are obtained from 
IGAE (1998-2005) and are reclassified in order to correspond to the available 
microeconomic profiles. Table 2 shows the aggregates for the periods taken in the 
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analysis. Results start in 1996 and end in 2005, where the output gap reaches the value 
of zero for Spain. 
3.2. Results 
a) Standard vs. Cyclically Neutral Sustainability Measures 
In Figure 1 the evolution of the sustainability indicator (SI) for each subsequent year is 
reported. The measure shows a substantial variation over a relatively short period. It 
starts at 4.11 in 1996 and falls almost monotonically to 2.39 in 1999. From then on it 
increases again, reaching a maximum value of 4.48 in 2004, and it goes down again in 
2005. This extreme variation illustrates the main concern of this paper: the value of the 
GA sustainability indicators, indeed, appears to be very sensitive to the business cycle. 
Furthermore, this variation seems to be strongly correlated to the output gap, as it can 
be estimated through the EC method, as shown in Figure 2.  
By contrast, the value of SI once the budget balance is cyclically-adjusted varies 
to a lesser extent. For example, the conventional sustainability gap expressed in terms 
of annual GDP fell by roughly 0.99 percentage points from 1996 to 1997. The cyclical 
component of the improvement in this period was 0.48 percentage points, or roughly 
one half of the overall improvement. The balancing property of the cyclically neutral 
computation also comes through in the second half of the observation window, when 
the output gap was declining. For example, in the period from 2003 to 2004, 
conventional GA indicates that the sustainability gap increased by 0.79 percentage 
points. The cyclical element in this change was 0.51, or roughly two thirds of the 
annual change. In other words, roughly one third of the worsening in the fiscal 
sustainability measure was associated to factors unrelated to the business cycle.  
Hence, the first conclusion of our analysis is that the cyclical adjustment of the 
GA indicators matters. In fact, while the standard generational accounts suggests that 
the fiscal sustainability stance of Spain, if anything, slightly improved during the time 
period 1996-2005 (overall change in SI -0.36), cyclically neutral GA reveals that 
actually the opposite was the case. From 1996 to 2005, the adjustment need in terms of 
annual GDP increased from 2.63 percent to 3.75 percent, or roughly 42 percent. 
Below we will rely on our proposed decomposition method to show how much 
of the deterioration in the cyclically neutral accounts over time is due to pure policy 
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effects, and how much due to the other possible effects, namely the debt evaluation and 
the demographic effects. 
b) Decomposition Uncovering Pure Policy Effects 
Table 3 shows the complete results for the sustainability indicator SI.7. In the first two 
columns of the upper panel a), the value of the sustainability indicator SI is shown 
before and after the cycle correction, i.e. estimating equations (1) and (6). The next two 
columns show the series of sustainability indicators obtained estimating equation (8) – 
when previous debt is used –, and from equation (9) – with both previous debt and 
population.  
Below, in panel b) the decomposition effect is shown. First, column 1 computes 
the cycle effect as the difference between the change in sustainability before and after 
cycle correction. Second, the wealth effect is computed subtracting column 3 from 
column 2.  Third, the demographic effect is calculated as the difference between 
columns 3 and 4. As indicated above, the policy effect can be obtained as a residual. 
But it can be also obtained subtracting the sustainability indicator in column 2 for the 
previous year from column 4, as both are free of cycle effects and contain the same 
population and wealth figures. 
Figure 3 illustrates how the year-to-year changes in the cyclically neutral fiscal 
sustainability indicator SI decompose into the different effects. With respect to the 
wealth effect, we can see that there have been windfall losses worsening sustainability 
that increase the SI for all periods except for 2004. In most years, this effect if rather 
small (below 0.1 percentage points of GDP), and aggregating it over the entire 
observation window, it is equivalent to 0.43 percent of annual GDP. 
Also the demographic effect is rather small throughout, and it has worked in the 
opposite direction to the wealth effect with the exception of the period 1996-1997. The 
slight improvement in sustainability for demographic reasons seems to be due to the 
massive entry of immigrants to Spain during the observation period, which has two 
opposite effects on fiscal sustainability. On the one hand, the sustainability gap 
                                                 
7 The set of results for the SG indicator is available from the authors upon request. The results obtained 
for either of the two indicators are quite similar. Recall that the indicator SI sets the SG in relation to 
future earnings capacity – the sum of the present value of future GPD. The cycle correction affects both 
figures in the same direction, i.e., reduces them in an expansion and increases then in a recession, 
affecting the SI ratio twice, which, consequently, varies to a somewhat greater extent. 
15 
becomes larger, as the projected net fiscal contribution of the immigrants is negative. 
On the other hand, the larger population implies a larger income base to finance the 
sustainability gap. In other words, the denominator of the SI measure becomes larger, 
too. The positive demographic effect shows that the latter effect dominates the former. 
During the observation window the total of the alleviating demographic effect (-
0.49) is almost as large as the additional burden from the wealth effect (0.44). 
Therefore, the overall development of the cyclically neutral sustainability measure is 
dominantly a reflection of the pure policy effect we seek to uncover. Figure 3 clearly 
shows that fiscal policy in Spain, in structural terms, was expansionary during most 
years of the observation window. The only exceptions are the episodes 1996-97, 1998-
99 and 2004-05, when the cyclically neutral sustainability gap declined by 0.65, 0.10 
and 0.53 percentage points per annual future GDP, respectively. Policy is shown to 
worsen in the remainder of the periods, with especially strong structural expansion of 
future liabilities during 1997-8, 1999-2000 and 2003-4. Therefore, fiscal sustainability 
in cyclically neutral terms in sum has declined by 1.17 percentage points in terms of 
annual future GDP. 
This contradicts the general perception at that moment of Spain being an 
outstanding example of fiscal consolidation in the EU.8 In contrast to what conventional 
generational accounting would tell us, Spain did not manage to consolidate its 
intertemporal liabilities in the period before the current economic crisis. In fact, one 
may claim that the current public debt crisis in Spain is to some extent a reflection of 
insufficient budgetary discipline during the previous decade of above average growth 
and declining interest payments on public debt, which seemingly improved fiscal 
sustainability. By looking at Table 2, we can see that positive tendencies in some 
budget aggregates (e.g., unemployment expenditures, age-related expenditure due to 
certain pension cuts) are outweighed by growth in non-age-related expenditures. 
Probably the decentralization process, in which Spain was involved at that time, had a 
role in this trend.  
Nevertheless, if one considers the slight overall improvement in fiscal 
sustainability associated with the pure cyclical effect, it is also true that things could 
                                                 
8 See Mulas et al.(2004) and González-Páramo (2001) for a discussion on the Spanish fiscal consolidation 
process during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
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have gone even worse if Spain had wasted the improvement in short term fiscal 
balances during the expansionary phase of the business cycle.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
Generational accounting has become a broadly applied technique for assessing long-
term feasibility of fiscal policies. It is especially well suited to evaluate the effects of 
demographic ageing on intertemporal fiscal sustainability. One of the drawbacks of the 
technique, however, is the sensitivity of the resulting sustainability indicators with 
respect to the business cycle. As a consequence, generational accounting indicators may 
not be very informative when it comes to comparing intertemporal fiscal imbalances 
over time or across countries. This is true, even if the underlying empirical standards as 
regards the demographic and fiscal forecasting procedures are identical. 
The paper shows a solution to this issue: a methodological modification of 
generational accounting, which aims at fiscal sustainability indicators that are 
independent of the cycle. The method relies on incorporating cyclically-adjusted 
balances (computed according to established standards) into the forward-looking budget 
projections underlying the concept.  
Our empirical application using data from Spain demonstrates that the 
differences between conventional and cyclically neutral generational accounting can be 
very substantial. In our example case the two methods lead to completely different 
judgements of how fiscal sustainability changed during the window of observation. 
While conventional generational accounting would suggest a consolidation process 
(associated with growing primary surpluses), the cyclically neutral approach reveals that 
in structural terms, the consolidation measures adopted by fiscal policy decision makers 
actually were inadequate to render fiscal policy truly sustainable even in a neutral macro 
economic growth environment. Hence, apparently, the need to prepare for the EMU 
seems to have failed to have the expected effect on fiscal consolidation. Probably, the 
internal decentralization process in which Spain was involved during the same period, 
acted in the opposite direction. 
From the example application of our proposed method, one should not conclude, 
however, that measurement error in the pure policy effect when looking at first 
differences of conventional generational accounting measures is always substantial. In 
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fact, comparing of our results with previous findings for Germany by Hagist and Benz 
(2008) suggests that the differences between the conventional and the cyclically neutral 
fiscal sustainability measures could be much smaller under different circumstances. A 
key parameter of how important the budget cycle can be in a generational accounting 
analysis is the degree to which automatic stabilizers smoothing cyclical budget balances 
are built into the respective fiscal system. In countries where automatic stabilizers play 
an important role, like in the Germany, the necessity for cyclically neutral approaches 
will be less strong than in countries where automatic stabilizers are relatively week, like 
in Spain.  
The sensitivity of the gap between conventional and cyclically adjusted fiscal 
sustainability indicators to the size and structure of automatic stabilizers would warrant 
attention in further research. Thus, additional country studies of cyclical effect, or a 
more formal assessment based on systematic numerical simulations of model 
economies, would be welcome. In any case, cyclically neutral generational accounting 
measures will remain if one seeks to draw cross-country comparisons: not only the 
current state of the cycle, but also the role of automatic stabilizers will generally differ 
between countries. 
To conclude, it is worth highlighting that our proposed method does not only 
take care of cyclical fluctuations. It furthermore allows for handling two additional 
effects that are independent of the cycle, but may obscure the pure policy effect of 
interest – a debt evaluation effect and a demographic effect. Again, our practical 
application shows that these theoretically conceivable effects can also be of practical 
importance. Therefore, it appears that not only the cycle correction method but also the 
proposed further decomposition technique of the cyclically neutral sustainability 
measures is in order, whenever the task is to make generational accounting results 
comparable over time and/or across countries. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Standard Generational Accounting Sustainability Indicator 1996-2005 
Note: Sustainability Gap in Terms of Annual Future GDP. The measure SI indicates the size of the immediate 
adjustment of the primary government budget surplus required to achieve fiscal sustainability, in terms of annual 
GDP. 
 
 
Figure 2. Correlation of Impact of Cycle Neutralization and Output Gap 
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Figure 3. Decomposition of Annual Changes in Cyclically Neutral Fiscal Sustainability Indicator 
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Table 1 Elasticity of Public Budget Aggregates with Respect to Output Gap 
 Corporate 
Taxes 
Personal 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Social 
Security 
Contributions 
Current 
Expenditure 
Total 
Balance 
Spain 1.15 1.92 1.00 0.68 -0.15 0.44 
OECD 1.50 1.26 1.00 0.71 -0.10 0.44 
Euro area 1.43 1.48 1.00 0.74 -0.11 0.48 
New EU 
members 1.38 1.15 1.00 0.71 -0.06 0.42 
Source: Girouard and André (2005) 
 
 
Table 2 Budget Aggregates 1996-2005 (% GDP)   
Taxes/Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
VAT 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.8 6.4 6.4 
Personal Income Tax 7.3 7.4 7.2 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.6 
Social Security Contributions 12.2 12.2 12.1 12.2 12.0 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 
Excise Taxes 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Capital Income Tax and Other Taxes 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.3 4.0 4.4 4.3 4.6 5.2 
Total Age-Specific Revenue 31.0 31.4 31.4 31.9 31.3 31.0 31.3 31.3 31.8 32.7 
 
Transfers  
Contributory Pensions 9.9 9.7 9.5 9.3 9.1 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.5 
Non-Contributory Pensions 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Unemployment and Temporary Incapacity 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 
Health Expenditure 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.7 
Family and Long-Term Care 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Educational Expenditure 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.45 4.4 4.4 
Total Age-Specific Expenditure 24.1 23.4 22.9 22.4 21.7 21.4 21.5 21.4 21.8 21.7 
Non-Age-Specific Net Expenditure 6.5 6.4 6.8 7.0 7.3 7.1 7.5 7.5 8.1 8.0 
 
Primary Balance 0.4 1.6 1.7 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.3 1.9 3.0 
Interest Payments 5.3 4.9 4.5 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.6 1.8 
Current Balance -5.0 -3.3 -2.7 -1.3 -1.2 -0.9 -0.8 -0.5 -0.6 1.3 
 
Initial – past year - Debt / GDP 61.0 64.7 63.1 61.2 57.4 55.0 51.9 49.1 45.6 43.2 
 
Output Gap -3.3 -2.2 -0.8 0.7 2.2 2.2 1.1 0.2 -0.5 0.0 
Cyclically Adj Primary Balance 1.6 2.3 2.0 2.2 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.1 3.1 
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Table 3 Decomposition of Changes in Fiscal Sustainability Indicator (SI)  
  
 a) series of sustainability indicators 
 1. (Eq 1) 2. (Eq 6) 3. (Eq 8) 4. (Eq 9) 
 Current budget Cyclically neutral (CN) CN previous debt 
CN previous debt 
and population 
1996 4.10 2.63   
1997 3.11 2.15 1.98 1.98 
1998 3.10 2.75 2.70 2.71 
1999 2.40 2.70 2.64 2.65 
2000 2.58 3.48 3.42 3.55 
2001 2.75 3.63 3.58 3.64 
2002 3.21 3.65 3.64 3.71 
2003 3.69 3.77 3.75 3.83 
2004 4.47 4.27 4.28 4.38 
2005 3.75 3.75 3.72 3.75 
      
 b) Isolating the policy effect 
 Δ1-Δ 2 2-3 3-4  Δ1 
 Cyclical Effect Wealth Effect 
Demographic 
Effect Policy Effect Total Effect 
1997 -0.51 0.16 0.00 -0.65 -0.99 
1998 -0.62 0.06 -0.02 0.57 -0.01 
1999 -0.64 0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.69 
2000 -0.61 0.06 -0.13 0.85 0.18 
2001 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.16 0.17 
2002 0.44 0.02 -0.08 0.09 0.46 
2003 0.36 0.02 -0.08 0.18 0.48 
2004 0.28 -0.00 -0.10 0.61 0.79 
2005 -0.20 0.02 -0.03 -0.53 -0.73 
 
